“Key to the Future”: British American Tobacco and Cigarette Smuggling in China by Lee, Kelley & Collin, Jeff
‘‘Key to the Future’’: British American
Tobacco and Cigarette Smuggling in China
Kelley Lee
1*, Jeff Collin
2
1 Centre on Global Change and Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom, 2 Centre for International Public Health Policy, School of
Health in Social Science, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Funding: This research is supported
by funding from the National Cancer
Institute of the United States
National Institutes of Health (grant
number R01 CA91021–01). The
authors also received funding from
the Wellcome Trust, Health Canada,
and Cancer Research UK for the
creation of the BAT Document
Archive. The funders had no role in
study design, data collection and
analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: KL and JC
collaborated with the University of
California San Francisco and the
Mayo Clinic in the Guildford
Archiving Project, which created the
BAT Document Archive. The authors
have received funding for tobacco
document research from the
Rockefeller Foundation and Cancer
Research UK. JC is an unpaid board
member of the International Agency
on Tobacco and Health.
Academic Editor: Thomas E.
Novotny, University of California,
United States of America
Citation: Lee K, Collin J (2006) ‘‘Key
to the future’’: British American
Tobacco and cigarette smuggling in
China. PLoS Med 3(7): e228. DOI: 10.
1371/journal.pmed.0030228
Received: September 23, 2005
Accepted: March 15, 2006
Published: July 18, 2006
DOI:
10.1371/journal.pmed.0030228
Copyright:  2006 Lee and Collin.
This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Abbreviations: BAT, British
American Tobacco; BATDA, British
American Tobacco Documents
Archive; BATHK, British American
Tobacco Hong Kong; BATUKE, British
American Tobacco United Kingdom
and Export; CNTC, China National
Tobacco Corporation; FCTC,
Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control; FESU, Far East Sales Unit; JV,
joint venture; PM, Philip Morris; PRC,
People’s Republic of China; TTC,
transnational tobacco company
* To whom correspondence should
be addressed. E-mail: kelley.lee@
lshtm.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Background
Cigarette smuggling is a major public health issue, stimulating increased tobacco
consumption and undermining tobacco control measures. China is the ultimate prize among
tobacco’s emerging markets, and is also believed to have the world’s largest cigarette
smuggling problem. Previous work has demonstrated the complicity of British American
Tobacco (BAT) in this illicit trade within Asia and the former Soviet Union.
Methods and Findings
This paper analyses internal documents of BAT available on site from the Guildford
Depository and online from the BAT Document Archive. Documents dating from the early
1900s to 2003 were searched and indexed on a specially designed project database to enable
the construction of an historical narrative. Document analysis incorporated several validation
techniques within a hermeneutic process. This paper describes the huge scale of this illicit trade
in China, amounting to billions of (United States) dollars in sales, and the key supply routes by
which it has been conducted. It examines BAT’s efforts to optimise earnings by restructuring
operations, and controlling the supply chain and pricing of smuggled cigarettes.
Conclusions
Our research shows that smuggling has been strategically critical to BAT’s ongoing efforts to
penetrate the Chinese market, and to its overall goal to become the leading company within an
increasingly global industry. These findings support the need for concerted efforts to
strengthen global collaboration to combat cigarette smuggling.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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Cigarette smuggling has emerged as a critical public health
issue. As well as being the source of huge losses in government
revenues, smuggling makes cigarettes more affordable, thus
stimulating consumption and undermining control measures,
most notably among youth and low-income consumers [1,2].
The illicit trade in tobacco is served by three broad categories
of supply, namely, counterfeiting, bootlegging, and large-
scale smuggling. This paper focuses on large-scale smuggling
of cigarettes and other tobacco products that circumvent tax
regimes, which accounts for the vast majority of cigarettes
smuggled globally [1]. Recent estimates suggest that the trade
in smuggled cigarettes accounts for around 6%–8% of global
consumption [3] and around one-quarter of total exports [4].
The centrality of provisions to combat smuggling within the
World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) [5] indicate recognition of this
worldwide problem.
Tobacco industry documents, released following litigation
in the United States, have demonstrated the complicity of
British American Tobacco (BAT) in large-scale smuggling [6].
Whereas previous work has illustrated the strategic impor-
tance of smuggling to BAT’s expansion in Asia [7] and the
former Soviet Union [8], this paper offers the ﬁrst detailed
analysis of corporate involvement in contraband to one
country. The signiﬁcance of this work is enhanced by China’s
status as the world’s largest cigarette market, comprising 350
million smokers and one-third of cigarettes smoked [9]. So far
dominated by domestic producers, China is seen as the
‘‘ultimate prize’’ [10] among the world’s emerging tobacco
markets because of a potentially huge demand for foreign
brands.
China has long been recognised as also having ‘‘possibly
the largest cigarette smuggling problem in the world’’ [11].
Legal imports of foreign cigarettes comprise about 3% of
the 1.7 trillion (1.7 3 10
12) stick market. However, up to 50
billion (5 3 10
10) foreign cigarettes were believed to be
entering the country illegally each year by the late 1990s
[11–13]. In recent years, Chinese government efforts to
crack down on smuggling activities, and recover some of
the US$1.8 billion in lost tax revenue annually [12], have
led to the strengthening of the General Administration of
Customs, including administrative and criminal penalties
for smuggling [14]. While there have been criminal
prosecutions of some individuals and widely reported
media accounts of this illicit trade [6,15], scholarly research
on the role of tobacco companies remains limited. Using
evidence from internal documents of the tobacco industry,
this paper begins by describing the huge scale of this illicit
trade and the key supply routes by which it has been
conducted. It examines BAT’s efforts to optimise earnings
by restructuring operations and controlling the supply
chain (how cigarettes are manufactured and legally ex-
ported, are handled by various ‘‘agents’’ or middlemen, and
then sold illicitly as contraband) and the pricing of
smuggled cigarettes. Indeed, documents produced in
litigation demonstrate that smuggling has been strategically
critical to BAT’s ongoing efforts to penetrate the Chinese
market, the ‘‘key to the future’’ [16] in BAT’s overall goal to
become the leading company within an increasingly global
industry.
Methods
This paper is based on analysis of documents dating
between the early 1900s and 2003 from the BAT Depository
in Guildford, United Kingdom. The broad strengths and
limitations of tobacco industry documents as a data source
[17,18], their application to the speciﬁc issue of smuggling [7],
and the distinctive value of, and problems posed by, the
Guildford Depository [19,20] have been previously described.
Research for this paper was based on an iterative search
strategy, commencing with searching the depository’s crude
ﬁle index in 2003 using the keywords China, Chinese, PRC
(People’s Republic of China), Sino*, Peking/Beijing, Shanghai,
Canton/Guangdong, CNTC (China National Tobacco Corpo-
ration), and Hong Kong. A total of 210 ﬁles were identiﬁed
and reviewed. This search was then supplemented by similar
searches between October 2004 and September 2005 of the
BAT Documents Archive (BATDA) Web site containing
Guildford and additional BAT-related documents dating to
2003, exploiting the increasing online availability of BAT
documents [20]. Documents used in this analysis date from
1983–1999.
BATDA also enabled advanced Boolean searches via
combined keywords, including well-recognised euphemisms
for smuggling deﬁned within BAT documents ([21,22];
available as Text S1 and S2, respectively), such as ‘‘transit’’,
‘‘general trade’’ ( ‘‘GT’’), ‘‘duty not paid’’ ( ‘‘DNP’’), and ‘‘free
market’’ [7]. A total of 2,594 online documents were reviewed.
From both on site and online sources, 882 relevant docu-
ments on China and 2,502 on Hong Kong were indexed on a
specially designed project database to enable the construc-
tion of an historical narrative. Document analysis incorpo-
rated several validation techniques within a hermeneutic
process [23], including corroboration of interpretation
between authors and attempted triangulation of ﬁndings via
trade publications, newspaper articles, academic journals,
and other secondary sources.
Results
Circumventing Barriers to Market Entry
The Chinese tobacco market remained closed to foreign
companies for more than three decades, but in the late 1970s
the ‘‘open door’’ policy reintroduced potential access to this
market. Confronted with tight import quotas and high tariffs,
however, transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) made
limited progress in the world’s largest market via legal trade
[24]. Under Chinese law, the State Tobacco Monopoly
Administration is the sole agency allowed to trade in tobacco.
A special agency under the State Tobacco Monopoly
Administration runs all imports and exports of tobacco leaf
and cigarettes. No individuals, state, or private enterprises
are permitted to engage in this trade. State permits or
licenses are needed for all imports, which are subject to
tariffs. By the late 1980s, quantities of smuggled cigarettes
conﬁscated rose markedly, although they represented only a
fraction of the total contraband, estimated at 5%–10% of
China’s annual production. Between 1988 and 1992, 26,100
million sticks were seized by customs ofﬁcials [25]. In 1998,
Premier Zhu Rongji initiated a national anti-smuggling
campaign, resulting in regular seizures of millions of sticks
[11,26,27].
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smuggling of foreign cigarettes into China to circumvent
barriers to market access. Ofﬁcial trade ﬁgures and other
documents cite levels of legal imports, subject to State
Tobacco Monopoly Administration quotas and tariffs
(180% in 1985) and sold by licensed retailers, duty-free
shops, and so-called friendship stores largely frequented by
foreign visitors. Comparing ofﬁcial data for selected years,
which represent imports by all TTCs, to BAT’s sales ﬁgures to
China reveals dramatic discrepancies (Table 1). For example,
during 1990, ofﬁcial imports from all TTCs totalled 10.5
billion sticks, whereas BAT documents describe company
exports to China of over 20.3 billion sticks. The company
recognised this trade as ‘‘one of the larger proﬁt centres in
BAT Industries’’ [28], with 25% of BAT’s proﬁts coming
‘‘from transit trade to China’’ [29].
The difﬁculty in accounting for such discrepancies is
evident in a numbered list of questions and answers prepared
by BAT’s corporate communications department to prepare
staff for answering potential questions about the proposed
restructuring of BAT operations in China (discussed below).
While direct questions about smuggling were answered with
claims that high taxation caused such activity—a commonly
recited argument unsupported by independent empirical
evidence [1,2,30]—no response was offered regarding the
divergence between Chinese and BAT import ﬁgures:
11. Are you aware that cigarettes are smuggled into some
Far East markets, particularly China
A. Yes! We are aware cigarettes are smuggled in some parts
of the world. This is usually a result of tax differentials,
providing an incentive for some to trade illegally in our
products. We are opposed to such activities because they
have an adverse impact on our legitimate sales...
15. How do you explain the differences in ﬁgures quoted by
your company (M Broughton presentation) regarding
exports to China and ofﬁcially published ﬁgures by the
government of PRC?
A. [31]
Restructuring to ‘‘exploit opportunities for the sale of BAT
Group products to private traders selling into China’’ [32]
Control of the contraband supply chain was essential to
optimise BAT sales within different markets, and to avoid
unwanted attention from customs and excise ofﬁcials [33].
BAT initiated a restructuring of its China and Hong Kong
operations in 1990 ‘‘to improve the effectiveness of the
Group’s penetration of the China market’’ [34]. Problems
over supply routes (see Protocol S1 for detailed discussion of
supply routes for smuggled cigarettes) were seen to require
stronger central management of the export trade:
The reasons for transferring the business from Hong Kong
to UK include the increasing need to control centrally the
distribution and sourcing of the Group’s international
brands [35].
The impending handover of Hong Kong to Chinese rule in
1997 was a particular concern. BAT Hong Kong (BATHK) was
responsible for the Hong Kong and Macau domestic markets,
as well as what is described as ‘‘combined exports’’ to China.
Sales to China in 1991 accounted for ‘‘the largest part of the
[BATHK] business...representing approximately 92% of the
total’’ [36]. The existing structure of BAT operations in the
region was seen as unsatisfactory by David Leach (Project Co-
Ordinator, Far East Sales Unit [FESU], BATHK):
There is inadequate segregation of the management of the
various markets currently served by BAT HK, marketing
activities are inadequately co-ordinated and the structure
is insufﬁciently ﬂexible to respond to changes which may
occur in the lead up to 1997 [36].
Reorganisation was seen as necessary to facilitate further
expansion of the contraband trade across Asia. As Roy Salter
(Group Planning Coordinator, BAT Industries) wrote, ‘‘Op-
portunities will emerge for sales to traders dealing in other
markets, e.g. Thailand, possibly in conﬂict with established
BATUKE [BAT United Kingdom and Export] and B&W
[Brown and Williamson] agents, such as SUTL [Singapura
United Tobacco Limited]’’ [37].
In 1990, a report was commissioned from consultancy ﬁrm
Grifﬁths Management Limited to develop management and
corporate structures that would provide BAT ‘‘with a
competitive advantage over other international manufac-
turers’’ [38] in China. The subsequent report envisaged a 3-
fold division of responsibility. First, BATHK would be
restricted ‘‘to manufacturing and selling in the [Hong Kong]
domestic market and to manufacturing under contract for
other markets as required’’ [39]. Second, BAT China would be
established, with responsibility for ‘‘direct [legal] imports to
China, for managing the relationship with CNTC and for
establishing a strong presence for BAT brands within the
China market’’ [39].
The proposed restructuring would be completed with the
creation of ‘‘an offshore company...domiciled in the UK’’ to
Table 1. Official Chinese Imports and Cited BAT Exports to China
for Selected Years between 1982 and 2000
Year Total Official Imports
(Millions of Sticks)
Exports Cited in
BAT Documents
Millions
of Sticks
Context
1982 202 [88] 811 Total sales of BAT brands made
in Hong Kong, or shipped by
the brand owners through
Hong Kong, into the southern
provinces of China [89]
1984 547.7 [88] 2,653 For BATHK (China) [90]
1985 433 [88] 6,101 Total volume [90]
1990 10,551 [91] 20,300 Total volume [92]
1994 9,000 [25] 46,290 Total planned volume [93]
1995 26,372 [91] 39,700 Forecast sales [92]
1996 17,960 [94] 21,297.8 State Express 555 sales [95]
2,852.8 Kent sales [95]
17,691.7 Hilton sales [95]
230.8 John Player Gold Leaf sales [95]
2000 25,353 [91] 39,700 Forecast sales [96]
2003 1,878 [97] 107,245 [98]
2004 2,134 [97] 113,919 [98]
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030228.t001
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other adjacent markets’’. The offshore company was provi-
sionally named BAT Distribution, and later referred to as
International Tobacco (Overseas) Limited, and the report was
explicit in the description of its proposed remit:
The transit trade for China, Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia
should be undertaken by BAT Distribution Limited,
incorporated in a tax haven of choice, probably UK. It
could be owned by BAT Industries or whatever other
company BAT Group prefers.
BAT Distribution should be little more than a brassplate
company with very low overhead and the ﬂexibility to
establish branch ofﬁces wherever the transit traders move
[38].
The primary objective of this complex model was to
provide an operational divide between legal and illegal trade
while, critically, ensuring clear oversight and control:
BAT Distribution is set up to enable BATHK to effect a
formal separation of its transit from its ofﬁcial trade by
transferring the transit trade to this company. BAT
Distribution activities remain fully controlled by the BAT
China Group (and not any of its subsidiaries) but
structurally and formally, BAT Distribution is owned
elsewhere in the BAT Group in a tax haven [40].
The strategic need for this separation is reafﬁrmed by BAT
executives in discussing procedures for handling orders,
invoicing, payment, and supply [41]. The need for the
contraband trade to be carried out ‘‘on an arms-length basis’’
[42], which ‘‘removes BAT HK as an intermediary’’ [42], was
particularly noted. The company would ‘‘seek to identify
trading organisations which might have the potential to
function in a way similar to that of SUTL [Singapura United
Tobacco Limited]’’ [39]. The Grifﬁths report distinguished
this approach from what it termed ‘‘the Philip Morris model’’,
seen as reducing both proﬁtability and control over the
transit trade, while noting that the proposed approach would
not reduce BAT’s ability to ‘‘pretend ignorance’’ of complic-
ity in transit:
It has also been suggested that the Philip Morris model be
adopted which places an intermediary between Philip
Morris Asia and the transit traders. We have two
objections. First the transit trade still originates with Philip
Morris Asia and is controlled by that company. That is
similar to the present situation with BATHK except for the
intermediary. The second objection is that the interme-
diary adds another level of proﬁt absorption and is harder
to control than a dedicated group company. The apparent
distancing has little effect since the business is transit
trade. All the customers BATHK deals with are legitimate,
properly incorporated businesses. Provided this remains
the case the BAT Group can pretend ignorance that its
cigarettes are being distributed through the transit trade as
much and as justiﬁably as Philip Morris can [38].
Figure 1 illustrates the planned restructuring of BAT’s
China operations, with the contraband trade to be carried
out via ‘‘exporters’’ under the responsibility of an ‘‘inde-
pendent distributor’’.
This proposed restructuring was submitted to BAT Chair-
man Sir Patrick Sheehy in March 1991 by former Chairman
Barry Bramley, with the reported support of future Chairman
Figure 1. Planned Restructuring of BAT Operations to Separate Supply of ‘‘Independent Distributors’’ to China
Source: British American Tobacco Documents Archive. Available: http://bat.library.ucsf.edu/pageview?a¼img&tid¼fm41a99&total¼2. Accessed 19 June
2006.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030228.g001
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BAT and Cigarette Smuggling in ChinaMartin Broughton. The paper recommended that BAT
Distribution be established with the following responsibilities:
(a) To manage and to exploit opportunities for the sale of
BAT Group products to private traders selling into the
China, and adjacent general trade markets, in a regulated
manner, (effectively replacing the current role of
BAT(HK)).
(b) Identiﬁcation of new trading organisations with the
potential to supply China and adjacent markets.
(c) To ensure the efﬁcient distribution within the China
markets of duty free BAT products [32].
Sheehy and fellow directors approved the reorganisation in
April 1991, with BAT Distribution more discretely referred to
as ‘‘responsible for sales to trading organisations supplying
China and other adjacent territories’’ [34].
The planned reorganisation was then reviewed by in-house
staff and Price Waterhouse in terms of the complex tax
implications for BAT. Senior management sought to identify
the optimal location of the three proposed companies to
minimise tax liability, noting the ‘‘risk that the [UK] Inland
Revenue may examine the operation carefully as a result of
the overall reduced taxable proﬁts’’ [37].
Given such considerations, a revised restructuring pro-
posal, written by project co-ordinator David Leach and
supported by Bramley and BAT Far East Director (now Chief
Executive) Paul Adams, was submitted in November 1991 [43].
This proposal advanced a simpliﬁed model under which ‘‘the
role of servicing the China market and Hong Kong exports
will be taken over by two new organisations, BAT China and a
Far East Sales Unit (FESU) attached to BATUKE’’. BAT China
was to be wholly owned by BAT and have ‘‘responsibility for
sales of cigarettes to China National Tobacco Corporation,
Sino Russian Border Trade (SRBT) and China Duty Free
Shops as well as relations between the BAT Group and the
Government of PRC’’. The FESU, headed by Adams, was to
assume the role previously envisaged for BAT Distribution:
FESU, a Division of BATUKE, set up in the UK to co-
ordinate the export business currently serviced by BAT
HK, and to administer product invoicing and supply from
the manufacturers to BAT China, BAT HK and independ-
ent distributors. This unit, which will be managed as a
proﬁt centre, will be responsible for co-ordinating sales
forecasts, arranging contract manufacture and ensuring
shipments are made in accordance with schedules [43].
This arrangement would enable the group to take
advantage of the UK’s lower corporate tax rates [43], and
facilitate central control over China operations. In 1992, total
volumes shipped by the FESU to China were 22,889 million
sticks, projected to increase to 31,634 million sticks (turnover
of US$676.6 million) by 1994 [44]. As part of an overall
restructuring of BAT operations the FESU was renamed Asia
Paciﬁc North in 1993, and then subsequently absorbed under
the so-called Project Battalion into the newly formed Asia
Paciﬁc Regional Business Unit [45].
In seeking to further ‘‘disassociate BAT China from the
export business’’ and establish a ‘‘structure appropriate for
the return of Hong Kong to Chinese control in 1997’’ [46], the
contraband trade was to be shifted from Hong Kong to
Singapore, from where new supply routes into China were
already being explored [47]. This entailed BAT’s establish-
ment of a ‘‘consignment warehouse’’ in Singapore to enable
more ﬂexible and timely delivery to transit agents:
This is because we hope to be able to move the distribution
of product currently being sold through Hong Kong
exports to the Singapore warehouse which will act as a
buffer warehouse in the supply chain. We can minimise
costs if we can use ship-to-ship or container-to-container
transhipment through the Free Trade Zone in Singapore
[48].
In July 1993, the warehouse facility opened as ‘‘the export
supply point for approximately 40% of the combined export
sales volume into China’’, producing tax savings of £1.5
million (US$998,283) in 1993 ([49]; available as Text S3).
Controlling Prices to ‘‘enhance performance’’
While ofﬁcial imports were subject to import quotas and
tariffs, offering ‘‘relative poor corporate proﬁtability’’ [51],
BAT stood to earn huge proﬁts by careful pricing of
contraband cigarettes. An important consideration was how
price could be used to establish brand status within the
market. These efforts were apparent for the premium brand
State Express 555, which enjoyed ‘‘intrinsic exclusivity and
prestige’’ ([52]; available as Text S5). The company was keen
to build market share, in competition with other ‘‘interna-
tional brands’’, but wanted to avoid the threat of ‘‘oversupply
of SEFK [State Express Filter Kings] to erode price/image’’
[52,53]. While RJ Reynolds’s pricing strategy was closely
monitored ([54]; available as Text S6), BAT was especially
aware of Philip Morris (PM):
As CNTC outlets act as a showcase to Chinese smokers,
BAT has ensured that [State Express] 5559sp r i c ei s
positioned at the premium end and above the free market
[contraband] price. This deliberate strategy is designed to
enhance performance in the free market where the volume
is signiﬁcant. PM adopt a different approach, whereby
Marlboro positioned in price both well below 555s [sic]
price and below the free market price, has achieved brand
leadership in the channel. Despite this, with three key
brands BAT will still sell half as much again as PM, with a
corporate share estimated at 27% in 1992 (compared to
18.8% for PM) ([55]; available as Text S7).
There is evidence that BAT tried to ‘‘enhance perform-
ance’’ by controlling the prices of illegal imports ([50];
Available as Text S4). BAT thus sought to price its leading
brand at a carefully judged premium over those of its
competitors, notably PM, intending that State Express 555
should ‘‘maintain a 50 cent premium over Marlboro in both
the ofﬁcial (CNTC) and Free Market’’ [50], the precise
differential varying by channel and region.
The ability to inﬂuence pricing of both legal and illegal
imports was predicated on control of supply. The challenge
was to ensure sufﬁcient supply of BAT brands to compete
with domestic and other international brands, without
exerting downward pressure on prices. Indeed, the company
was aware of the ‘‘ability of free market to signiﬁcantly
undercut retail pricing of ofﬁcial duty paid outlets, partic-
ularly in the Southern provinces, thereby eroding our
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markets’’ [53]. For example, BAT became concerned that
the price of Brown and Williamson’s premium brand, Lucky
Strike, needed to be raised on the ‘‘free market’’, reportedly
‘‘42% below Marlboro’’ [56]. In seeking to control prices,
however, the company faced the potential problem of
alternative sources of contraband supplying the market:
The CNTC stores are one small source for leakage into the
free market....LSF [Lucky Strike Filter] is in the free
market in Guangzhou where its price is half that of
MARLBORO. The Brand Owner believes that any signiﬁ-
cant price increase will just suck in transit and that critical
mass is needed before any major price repositioning can be
embarked on...([57]; available as Text S8).
This careful balance between supply and price is described
by Kam Ka Ng (Research Manager for BAT China):
We could push as many cigarettes as possible, but to
maintain a consistent growth in the long term would
require a more strategic approach. We feel that we may be
milking the cow, and not feeding it enough to maintain its
premium positioning...([58]; available as Text S9).
Another complication was the growing presence of
counterfeits. By the mid 1990s, there were ﬁve sources of
foreign cigarette brands in China—cigarettes manufactured
locally under licence, legal imports, illegal imports by
appointed agents, illegal imports ‘‘leaked’’ from legal or
illegal suppliers, and counterfeits. A ‘‘signiﬁcant increase in
counterfeit products in China’’ [59] was reported in the late
1990s, and was attributed to the decline in both legal and
illegal imports following the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, which
pushed ‘‘infringers [counterfeiters] deeper underground’’ to
make ‘‘use of unknown transit routes’’ [60]. As Richard
Duncan (BATHK) wrote:
Counterfeit has become a major problem in China, causing
a loss to BAT in the order of 40 million pounds per annum.
Increasingly, there is evidence that China is becoming a
source of counterfeit for markets outside China, counter-
feiting brands that are not necessarily sold in China [61].
It is estimated that around two million cartons of counter-
feit cigarettes, both domestic and international brands, were
sold in China in 1999, double the amount in 1997. The
Chinese government believes that, in many cases, local
ofﬁcials are involved. Raids of factories and workshops
during 1998 yielded 3.15 billion counterfeit cigarettes [62].
‘‘It is important that BAT do not get left behind’’ ([63];
Available as Text S10): Smuggling in Pursuit of Global
Competitiveness
By the late 1980s, smuggling had become so lucrative that
concerns were raised that the pursuit of a joint venture (JV)
in China might be counterproductive:
On China, the current view was that the return from
exports (including some transit via the USSR) was much
higher than from investment. Therefore, a visit by the
Chairman [Patrick Sheehy] to Beijing in October (with the
ERT [European Round Table of Industrialists]) might
actually be counterproductive if he was under pressure to
commit to investment [64].
The company thus approached JV negotiations with
relative caution [24]. The strategic question to be answered,
according to Paul Adams, was ‘‘why are we looking at JV’s
rather than a continuation of transit...?’’ [65] Estimated sales
ﬁgures show that ‘‘Hong Kong exports’’ comprised 22% of
total sales volume and 27% of total proﬁts for BAT in 1992.
These proportions were expected to rise to 29% and 31%,
respectively, by 1997 [16].
While Hong Kong exports were seen as the ‘‘key to the
future [of BAT]’’, BAT Head of Corporate Planning Graham
Burgess recognised the trade’s vulnerability given the ‘‘danger
of serious action by the authorities’’ [16]. In reviewing the
BAT company plan for 1993–1997, BAT Group Planning
Coordinator Hilary Barton questioned the sustainability of
such rapid growth [66], while Adams cautioned against
excessive reliance on FESU sales:
It is clear that we have relied (and I suspect will continue to
rely) on Hong Kong Exports/FESU to meet budget and
drive BATCo. growth. I understand and accept the realities
of this.
However, it occurs to me that our ability to ‘‘make our
numbers’’ through Hong Kong Exports may have caused us
to ease the performance pressures off other markets...[67].
Progress by competitors seeking JVs in China was also a
concern. When PM reached agreement in 1993 for Marlboro
to be produced locally, a memo from BAT China’s Susan
Osborne warned of ‘‘serious implications for our GT [general
trade] business in China in the medium to longer term’’ [68],
while Adams feared ‘‘Philip Morris may encourage a G.T.
clamp-down’’ ([69]; available as Text S11).
Reliance on an increasingly vulnerable contraband trade in
the region shaped the extensive reorganisation of BAT
operations in 1993 under Projects Rubicon and Battalion.
Given ‘‘the increasing ‘globality’ of the tobacco business’’, the
need for structural change was recognised ‘‘if BATCo is to
fulﬁl its prime objectives of: (i) growing the value of BAT’s
brand assets and; (ii) maximising the income stream from
each region’’ [70]. The reorganisation was ‘‘made necessary,
largely because of the spectacular success of the export
business in recent years and our expectations that this growth
will continue’’ [71]. Combined management was seen as
‘‘necessary if we are to remain dynamic and progressive and
most importantly, successful in today’s competitive business
environment’’ [72]. The plan to pursue a twin-track strategy
to compete with other suppliers is detailed in a memo
entitled ‘‘Distribution Initiatives within PRC’’:
As long as free market sales remain dominant, alternative
routes of distribution of unofﬁcial imports need to be
examined, evaluated and, if appropriate, maximised. It is
recognised that distribution of our product in China is key
to BATCo’s long term success and a key objective within
BAT China’s JV initiative is to achieve widespread
distribution networks....
It is important that BAT do not get left behind...BAT
would beneﬁt through a wider spread of distribution,
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competition...It is envisaged that this initiative would be a
short to medium term strategy prior to establishment of
any JV operation and naturally any action taken would
need to run in parallel with our JV plans...[63].
As part of BAT’s ultimate goal of becoming ‘‘the Premier
Tobacco Company in the World’’ [71], the company sought to
reach other regions within China, with stated plans to
‘‘investigate alternative export routes/customers that will
improve direct penetration of UK brands in northern and
central provinces’’ [73].
Discussion
In common with other TTCs, BAT has depicted smuggling
as an inevitable consequence of ‘‘tax differentials, weak
border controls, and import restrictions and bans’’ [74]. In his
speech to the BAT Annual General Meeting in 2003, then
Chairman Martin Broughton urged governments to enter
into partnership with the industry to combat illicit trade:
Governments must consider whether they want the
industry to slip into the hands of trafﬁckers and criminals,
or to be run by legitimate, tax-paying companies working
to manage a risky product responsibly. Many governments
recognize that ‘Big Tobacco’ is ‘Responsible Tobacco’ [75].
The documents presented in this paper demonstrate that
the separation between ‘‘Big Tobacco’’ and ‘‘trafﬁckers and
criminals’’ has been less stark than such posturing would
suggest. While public statements by BAT have portrayed
smuggling as ‘‘inimical to our long-term business interests’’
[76], internal documents illustrate how the company’s
strategy in China, nonpareil among its future priorities,
centred on the supply, oversight, and control of the illicit
trade.
The documents demonstrate that contraband has been a
hugely proﬁtable and integral part of BAT operations in
China over the past two decades. Initially a means of
circumventing restricted access to the Chinese market, it
became a hugely proﬁtable income stream. Contraband was
then used to build market presence, in competition with
other international brands, with supply and price carefully
managed. By the early 1990s, smuggling into China repre-
sented ‘‘the largest BATCo market’’ [48], integral to the
growth of BAT overall and its aspirations to supersede PM to
become the world’s leading tobacco company. For the
Chinese government, this illicit trade undermined restric-
tions on imports, represented an enormous loss of tax
revenue, and stimulated demand for premium brand ciga-
rettes.
Alongside this lucrative trade, BAT China, deliberately
insulated from such operations, sought to build relations with
Chinese ofﬁcials [43]. Paul Bingham (Marketing Manager,
BAT) noted that BAT China’s planned medium-term strategy
should address ‘‘the ability of BAT to advise the Government
generally on tax revenue methods—VAT, excise, direct taxes,
oil, alcohol, etc’’ [77]. In 1994, Adams cited the smuggling
issue in a discussion with the Chinese ambassador to Britain
to gain support for a JV:
Demand for our international brands outstrips the supply
via the CNTC Friendship Stores and Duty Free shops. This
created a black market. Substantial domestic manufacture
by a j.v. would provide China with a share in the proﬁts
hitherto taken by smugglers....China had much more to
gain with us than without us ([78]; available as Text S12).
Yet such lobbying disguises the extent to which BAT has
been a critical part of the global smuggling problem, rather
than an appropriate partner in its resolution.
Neither BAT nor its senior directors have yet been held
accountable, whether via litigation or public inquiry. The
United Kingdom has perhaps come closest to pursuing
accountability via the concern of the House of Commons
Health Select Committee that led to a lengthy investigation
by the Department of Trade and Industry. The eventual
abandonment of this closed investigation in 2004, and the
decision, without publication of its ﬁndings, not to pursue a
criminal investigation [79], has come amid reports of undue
political inﬂuence exercised on BAT’s behalf at the highest
levels of government [80]. This, alongside the continued
accumulation of documented evidence of complicity, raises
questions that the Health Select Committee might usefully
revisit.
Given the inherently transnational nature of smuggling,
collective efforts across countries offer the most promising
avenue for developing an effective policy response. The
FCTC is particularly signiﬁcant in this respect, particularly
given China’s ratiﬁcation of the convention on 11 October
2005. The ﬁrst international public health treaty negotiated
by the World Health Organization, the FCTC both offers an
institutional basis to support the broad development of
tobacco control and incorporates a clear focus on tobacco
smuggling as a core issue in health policy. Indeed, smuggling
received a unique degree of attention via the International
Conference on Illicit Tobacco Trade [81], reﬂected in the
comparatively detailed coverage afforded the illicit trade via
Article 15 [82]. Notwithstanding such progress, however,
there is a clear need for the broad obligations of the FCTC to
be augmented with more speciﬁc measures via the negotia-
tion of a dedicated protocol on the illicit trade in tobacco
[83]. Such a protocol should incorporate, among other things,
anti-money-laundering provisions, a mandatory tracking
system of markings and codes, records of shipments, and a
strict liability and compensation system [84,85]. The basis for
such a compensation system might be provided by the
conditions accepted by Philip Morris International under
its 2004 agreement with the European Union [86], a system of
binding obligations that contrasts with the weaker voluntary
approach of ‘‘memoranda of understanding’’ advocated by
BAT [87].
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Editors’ Summary
Background. Smoking tobacco kills about 5 million people around the
world every year, and according to the World Health Organization, half of
the people who smoke will eventually die as a result. The habit is in
decline in most of the world’s richer nations, but it is growing in
developing countries. Governments can control consumption, and raise
substantial tax revenues, by levying high taxes on tobacco. However, this
is undermined when tobacco is smuggled into the country and sold
illegally. Smuggling makes cigarettes more affordable, thus stimulating
consumption, and undermines efforts to reduce smoking rates.
British American Tobacco (BAT) is one of the largest international
tobacco companies. Following a legal case in the United States, millions
of pages of BAT internal documents (dating back to the early 1900s)
have been made public. They are held in a depository in the United
Kingdom, and most can now be seen online. Researchers have already
undertaken wide-ranging studies of these documents and have drawn
conclusions about the way BAT has sought to enter emerging markets
throughout the world.
Why Was This Study Done? Previously published studies have
concluded that BAT has been ‘‘complicit’’ in large-scale cigarette
smuggling, described in documents by the euphemisms ‘‘transit,’’
‘‘general trade’’ (‘‘GT’’), ‘‘duty not paid’’ (‘‘DNP’’), and ‘‘free market.’’ This
study focuses on such activities in China, which is believed to have the
world’s biggest tobacco smuggling problem. China is a key market for
BAT and other tobacco companies because of the size of its population,
high smoking prevalence, and rapidly growing economy. The develop-
ment of effective tobacco control policy in China constitutes one of the
greatest opportunities to advance global health. The State Tobacco
Monopoly Administration is the only agency legally allowed to trade in
tobacco in China.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The authors have put
together an account of the company’s trading in China in the period
from 1986 to 1999. They begin by describing the scale on which tobacco
was smuggled into China and the main supply routes through which
tobacco entered the country. They found evidence that smuggling
increased considerably during the period.
The researchers found that BAT’s own documents describe the
company’s efforts to improve its earnings from China by restructuring
operations and controlling the supply chain—that is, how cigarettes are
manufactured and legally exported, are handled by various ‘‘agents’’ or
middlemen, and then are sold illicitly as contraband. The title of this
article is taken from one BAT document that states that exports from
Hong Kong to China are the ‘‘key to the future’’ of the company’s
planned growth. The researchers say that this can be taken to mean
smuggling, and that BAT’s documents indicate that the company
benefited from, encouraged, and attempted to control the smuggling of
tobacco into China.
What Do These Findings Mean? BAT has stated publicly that it does
not approve of smuggling. However, from the researchers’ analysis of the
information in the internal papers, they conclude that ‘‘the documents
demonstrate that contraband has been a hugely profitable and integral
part of BAT operations in China over the past two decades.’’ They
estimate that the value of the illicit trade amounts to billions of (United
States) dollars and go on to say that ‘‘for the Chinese government, this
illicit trade undermined restrictions on imports, represented an
enormous loss of tax revenue, and stimulated demand for premium
brand cigarettes.’’ The researchers argue that action should be taken
internationally to reduce tobacco smuggling.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0030228.
  Most of the documents used in this paper can be found at the British
American Tobacco Documents Archive created by public health
researchers (the Web site also contains useful information on tobacco
document research)
  The Tobacco Free Initiative, based at the World Health Organization,
provides information on the global scale of the tobacco problem, and
about efforts to combat the situation
  Many countries have national anti-smoking organizations; the United
Kingdom charity Action on Smoking and Health has a useful list of
these
  Information about the dangers of smoking to personal health and
advice on giving up the habit are available from the Web sites of the
American Academy of Family Physicians and NHS Direct (United
Kingdom National Health Service)
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